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Anti-Trust and Economic Theory:
Some Observationsfrom the US
Experience
G.A. HAY*

1. INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in US anti-trust can be characterised as reflecting the
uneasy interaction of two quite separate phenomena: first, the increased
emphasis on economic analysis as the overriding organising principle of antitrust policy and on economic efficiency as the primary (perhaps only)
relevant goal for anti-trust; second, the long-standing reluctance of the
federal judiciary to involve itself in any substantive economic analysis, and
the preference, instead, for simple rules of thumb or ‘pigeon holes’ to sort
out lawful from unlawful conduct.’ The result has been that while economics
has played a major role, it has not influenced American anti-trust as
thoroughly or as uniformly as might have been imagined; rather the extent
and the nature of its influence have depended on the degree to which the
relevant economics could be reduced to the kind of simple rules or pigeon
holes that the judiciary favours. The present paper will illustrate that theme,
first by reporting on the two developments separately and then by illustrating
their joint influence with reference to two important areas of American antitrust: predatory conduct and so-called vertical restraints. Finally, a contrast
will be made between judicial development in those two areas and recent
American merger policy which, it is argued, is carried out largely
independently of the judiciary, and hence the opportunities for economics to
influence the process are less inhibited by the judicial reluctance to undertake
extensive economic analysis.

*George Hay is Professor of Law and Economics at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York and is
currently a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, Oxford.
I

This theme is developed in greater detail in Hay (1984).
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11. THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC THEORY

The current emphasis by the Reagan administration on economic efficiency
as the primary goal of anti-trust policy is by now well known. William
Baxter, Reagan’s first appointee to head the Justice Department’s Antitrust
Division, was outspoken on the subject, both in his former career as a
Stanford University Law Professor and during his three year tenure as head
of the Antitrust Division. But while the emphasis on economics clearly
reached new heights under the Reagan administration, the trend dates at least
to the mid-l960s, when Donald Turner, both a lawyer and a PhD in
economics, headed the Division.
Two factors can be identified that have caused the trend to accelerate in
recent years. First is the increasing literacy of American law graduates in
economics. For reasons having little to do with anti-trust, economics became
an increasingly popular major among American college students during the
1960s and 70s. Since law school in America follows the undergraduate
degree, growing numbers of American students came to law school with
extensive prior education in economics. Moreover, most major law schools
were in the process of adding one or more economists to their faculties,
thereby providing further opportunity for students to become firmly
grounded in economics. With a larger number of lawyers feeling comfortable
with economics, the resistance to incorporating economic ideas into legal
analyses diminished.
A parallel phenomenon was the increased interest on the part of American
economists in policy questions relating to anti-trust law. For reasons partly of
intellectual curiosity and partly related to the money that could be earned
from offering ‘expert’ advice and testimony in anti-trust cases, excellently
trained economists drifted from other branches of economics to industrial
organisation (the branch of economics most closely related to anti-trust),
Equally importantly, the economists began to publish in law journals,
converting the formidable mathematical language of economic theory into
something approaching intelligible English. (There were still some diagrams,
but the increased training of lawyers in economics made that less of a
problem than it would have been twenty years before.)
111. ECONOMlCS AND THE JUDICIARY

In light of the above developments, it might seem that the way would be
cleared for the complete take-over of American anti-trust by economic
theory. But a second factor was operating which would serve both to retard
the influence of economics to some extent, and, more importantly, to
channel it in particular directions, not all of which the economic theorists
would unanimously approve. To understand these developments more fully,
however, a bit of background is required.
American anti-trust is conducted primarily in what can be called the
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judicial mode. That is, as a general rule, anti-trust activity gets underway
when a plaintiff files a lawsuit against a defendant. The suit is tried before a
federal district judge and, with increasing frequency, a lay jury. The judge is
not a specialist in anti-trust matters; indeed he or she may see an anti-trust
case quite infrequently (depending on the district) sandwiched in among drug
smuggling, bank robbery, and kidnapping cases. The jury is even less likely to
be knowledgeable about economics or anti-trust , with university education
the exception rather than the norm.
Anti-trust defendants are typically business corporations, but trade
associations (e.g. The New York Stock Exchange), professional organisations
(e.g. The American Medical Association), educational associations (e.g. The
National Collegiate Athletic Association), non-commercial entities (e.g. The
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), and even
cities (e.g. Boulder, Colorado), have been cast in the role of anti-trust
defendant.
The plaintiff in an American anti-trust case may be the Federal
Government (both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission have jurisdiction to enforce the anti-trust laws; Congress, which
believed in competition in the market place, also advocated competition to
enforce the anti-trust laws) or a state government suing on behalf of injured
consumers within the state. But by far the overwhelming number of anti-trust
cases are filed either by individual competitors (e.g. a doctor who is denied
hospital operating privileges) or business entities.
The numerosity and nature of non-governmental plaintiffs is important
(the Federal Government is typically a plaintiff in less than 10 per cent of
cases filed in Federal Court during a given year), since it suggests that the
attitude of the Justice Department, however strongly committed to economic
analysis as the organising principle of anti-trust and to economic efficiency as
the goal, has at best only an indirect influence on the bulk of anti-trust
activity. Private plaintiffs need be motivated by nothing more than financial
gain, and the judiciary is under no obligation, in the absence of new
legislation, to mimic the enforcement philosophy of a particular
administration.
Indeed, a dominant characteristic of the Federal Judiciary, in the ninetyfive years since the passage of the Sherman Act, has been a pronounced
reluctance to undertake any kind of substantive economic analysis in antitrust cases, preferring to decide cases with simple rules of thumb that enable
judges to categorise behaviour as lawful or unlawful. This theme was
sounded in the first substantive case to reach the Supreme Court in an antitrust matter, United States v Trans-MissouriFreight Association 166 US 290
(1897), where the Court refused to consider a defence argument that the
prices fixed by the cartel were no more than a reasonable level and that, in
any event, the higher prices were necessary for the long-term survival of the
railroad industry. The Court asserted its lack of expertise to consider such
questions, holding that any price fixing agreement was unlawful under the
61
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statute. Eventually, this mentality was crystallised in the per se rule for price
fixing.
The per se rule for price fixing is, however, merely the most obvious
illustration of the judiciary’s preference for simple rules of thumb and its
aversion to substantive economic analysis. Per se rules have governed other
areas as well, such as tie-ins and group boycotts,2 and even where no per se
rule applies, such as in merger cases, similarly simple rules (e.g. based on
market shares) are utilised.
IV. THE ASYMMETRICAL ADOPTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY
Surprisingly, the result of the judicial aversion to doing substantive economic
analysis is not that the courts always resist arguments based on economics.
Rather, the judicial response to the call for increased reliance on economic
analysis will depend critically on the nature of the analysis required. Courts
will incorporate the teachings of economic theory where those teachings can
be transformed into pigeon holes or simple rules. Where the relevant
economic advice would require the judge to perform economic analysis,
however, that advice is likely to be ignored. This point can be illustrated by
reference to two areas of recent activity in American anti-trust - the law on
monopolisation, especially with regard to so-ca!led predatory pricing, and the
law on vertical restraints, especially vertical price fixing or resale price
maintenance.
I . Predatory Pricing and Monopolisation

Going into 1975 the American case-law on monopolisation was in an
unsatisfactory state. Courts seemed torn between the desire to find a firm
which enjoyed a dominant position guilty per se of monopolisation, and the
perceived need to point to some specific conduct that could be labelled
‘culpable’ before unlawful monopolisation could be found. The unhappy
result seemed to be that virtually any action taken by a large firm to maintain
or increase its market share was labelled ‘exclusionary conduct’ and satisfied
the behavioural requirement for unlawful monopoly. This meant that once a
firm achieved a significant market share, almost nothing (short of rapidly
yielding the monopoly position) could be done to avoid a Sherman Act
violation. Included in the category of condemned conduct were price cuts,
since such cuts, when undertaken by a dominant firm, were likely to facilitate
the continuation of that dominance (at least in the sense of maintaining a
high market share), even if the price cuts were the quite natural business

There are established exceptions to the perse rule in some circumstances, e.g. for certain self-regulation
activities by professional organisations such as the American Medical Association, but until quite recently
the rule was sufficiently well entrenched to permit the generalisation made in this article. For a discussion
of how the per se rule has been applied with less rigidity in the past year or two, see Easterbrook (1984).
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reaction to the low prices of a new entrant or a heretofore unaggressive rival.
‘Predatory pricing’ was the label given to such price cuts by the dominant
firm and it was a label that meant almost certain conviction.
While the case-law could be criticised by economists as destroying the
incentive for firms that had achieved a large share by producing good
products and offering them to consumers at low prices to continue this
seemingly desirable conduct, arguably the result could be tolerated so long as
it was confined to the occasional industry giant, since a case could be made
that the economy would be well served by dissolving the monopolist’s power
regardless of how it had behaved. In addition the Justice Department could
be counted on to use its prosecutorial discretion to avoid attacking the truly
benificent large firm.
However, by the mid-l970s, the Justice Department had no monopoly on
anti-monopoly cases. Increasingly, the plaintiff in a Sherman Act case was
not the government, but a competitor of the large firm, and prosecutorial
discretion was replaced by the motto ‘Sue first - analyse later’, in the hope
that, regardless of the merits of the case, the large firm could be induced to
make a substantial financial settlement to avoid the risk of an adverse
judgement (which carried with it mandatory treble damages). Moreover, the
defendants were no longer only the well-known industrial giants, but
virtually any firm that had achieved a strong position, even in a ‘market’ that
was narrowly defined and small by absolute standards. In short, monopoly
litigation was out of control. Courts were swamped with cases, often against
small defendants accused of charging low prices. It would no longer do to
find all such firms guilty of monopolisation, yet the case-law seemed to offer
no principled way of sorting out the good from the bad.
Then in 1975 Harvard Law Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner
published a law review article3in which they proposed a remarkably simple (it
seemed at the time) solution to the predatory pricing morass. Price cuts by a
dominant firm would be presumed lawful so long as the resulting price level
exceeded the firm’s incremental costs of production. This would be true
without regard to the impact of the price cuts on the market share of the
dominant firm or on the viability of smaller rivals. Moreover, internal
memoranda suggesting that certain employees of the dominant firm desired
to kill off its rivals would do nothing to alter the presumption of legality, thus
saving the court from having to interpret the corporate ‘intent’ from dozens
of such memoranda.
The approach taken in the article conformed perfectly with the court’s
preference for simple rules of thumb. Other than defining the market and
measuring market share, the only issue was whether price was below cost.
Moreover, since the latter condition would rarely be satisfied, cases could

Areeda and Turner (1975).
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often be disposed of without conclusions on either relevant market or market
share.
The impact of the article was rapid and dramatic. Within months, the
article was being cited as support for dismissing cases and, over the several
years following, defendants were successful in the overwhelming number of
decisions that cited the a r t i ~ l e Indeed,
.~
frequently cases were disposed of
solely on the pleadings. The present article does not necessarily argue that the
development was a desirable one, or that the economic analysis that underlay
the Areeda-Turner rules was correct. (I come back to that point a bit later.)
The episode is notable because it represents a circumstance in which the
courts responded rapidly and enthusiastically to the advice of economists.
Economics was influential because the relevant advice, rightly or wrongly,
could be compressed into simple rules of t h ~ r n b . ~
2. Vertical Restraints

As in the case of predatory pricing, the pre-1975 case-law on vertical
restraints6 was the subject of extensive discussion and criticism from
economists.’ Yet the literature, while acknowledged by courts in opinions on
the subject, was not nearly so successful in influencing the development of
the case-law.
No doubt, many factors can be cited that may have contributed to the
result, but at least two are consistent with the theme of this article. First, the
existing law was relatively simple. Based on the alleged common law
prohibition of restraint on alienation, the law, with few exceptions,*held all
vertical restraints unlawful per se. Surely nothing could be more convenient
from the perspective of a judiciary averse to conducting extensive economic
analysis.
Second, the specific advice explicit or implicit in the economics literature
on vertical restraints seemed not readily amenable to simple rules.
Economists had theorised that a manufacturer might need to restrict price
competition among its retail dealers in order to induce dealers to undertake
costly promotional activities that would substantially increase the overall
demand for the product. (Even though the retail price might be higher as a

See Hurwitz and Kovacic (1982).

An important additional factor at work was the absence of any alternative simple rules.

For a detailed discussion of the history of vertical restraints in the American courts, see Hay (1985).

’ The criticism dates at least to

1960. See Telser (1960).

Situations where the goods were given to the retailer under a consignment arrangement were treated
more favourably. In addition, a manufacturer could choose unilaterally not to deal with certain retailers
(e.g. price cutters), so long as no agreement could be implied between the manufacturer and dealers that
followed the manufacturer’s wishes. See Hay (1985).
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result, the positive demand-generating effect of this promotional activity
would more than offset the reduction in sales from the higher retail prices.)
Hence vertical restraints could actually improve the attractiveness of the
product in the minds of consumers and thereby could be said to improve
competition among manufacturers even though it restricted competition
among retailers of the individual manufacturer.
Unfortunately, the literature, while demonstrating that vertical restraints
could improve competition and promote economic efficiency, did not, with
few exceptions, argue that improved efficiency was the only possible result.
For example, vertical restraints might reduce competition if they facilitated
collusion among competing manufacturers. The courts were given no clear
guidelines on when vertical restraints would turn out to improve consumers'
welfare, and when they would worsen it. Thus, if the courts were to take
economic advice seriously, they apparently would be required to ascertain the
net impact of the vertical restraint in each instance, necessitating the kind of
extensive economic analysis they were reluctant to undertake.
The result, not surprisingly, was that courts ignored the economics
literature entirely for a time and, even when the literature began to be cited,
the analysis was either disregarded when it came to fashioning the rules or
used to justify distinctions that did not flow logically from the relevant
economic analysis. Thus, at present, the law distinguishes outright price
restraints, i.e. resale price maintenance, from non-price restraints, such as
allocating exclusive territories among retail distributor^.^ Such distinctions
have the nice pigeon hole character that courts prefer, but would not find
support in much of the relevant economics literature, including that cited by
the courts. As a consequence of the disparate treatment given the two kinds
of restraints, litigation focuses not on the competitive impact but instead on
the distinction, with plaintiff attempting to characterise facially non-price
restraints as in fact price restraints.'O
Overall, then, economic theory would be judged less influential in affecting
the development of the case-law on vertical restraints. For a time the
economics literature was ignored entirely, and then cited in support of rules
that did not flow logically from the economists' analyses. A primary reason
for this result was, in my opinion, the fact that the relevant economics placed
too much of a burden on the courts to sort out good restraints from bad.
Until the economic advice can be compressed (perhaps with some acceptable

The former is illegal per se. The latter is subject to rule of reason analysis since the decision in GTE
Sylvuniu Inc v Continental TV fnc 433 US 36 (1977). The opinion in Sylvuniu gave lower courts no clear
guidance about how a rule of reason inquiry should be undertaken. As a consequence, most non-price
restraints have been upheld.
l o This was a main issue in the recent case Monsunto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corp 104 S.Ct. 1464 (1984).
In its opinion, the Court acknowledged the difficulty of distinguishing price and non-price restraints, but

insisted that lower courts continue to make the distinction.
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level of distortion) into simple rules of thumb or pigeon holes" it is not likely
to dominate the judicial analysis in the way the literature on predatory pricing
succeeded in doing.
To summarise the argument thus far, it is not necessarily the case that
courts will resist the teachings of economists in formulating decisions on antitrust cases. However, economics is likely to be influential only if it can be
compressed into relatively simple rules of thumb. More complex economic
analysis is likely to be ignored entirely or to be so distorted in its adaptation
to legal rules that the results may be no better than had economics been left
out of the picture entirely.
3. Merger Policy

The point can be illustrated further with reference to merger policy in the
United States. As in the case of predatory pricing, economists have had a
dramatic impact, but, unlike predatory pricing, the relevant economics is not
simple and does not take the form of simple yes or no rules. The 1984
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines require very sophisticated
quantitative judgements in the process of defining relevant product and
geographic markets and in attributing to firms some measure of market
strength. I * In addition, the possible negative effects from increased
concentration in a properly defined market are to be weighed against possible
efficiencies that might be gained from the merger in order to determine the
net impact on economic efficiency.
Yet despite these complexities, the relevant economics achieved virtually
instantaneous implementati~n.'~The reason, as suggested by the label
'Department of Justice Guidelines', is that, as a practical matter, merger
policy in the United States is not carried out in the judicial mode. All mergers
of consequence must be notified in advance to the Justice DepartmentI4and
if the Department elects to challenge the merger in court and so notifies the
parties concerned, nine times out of ten the contemplated merger will be
abandoned. Perhaps equally importantly, all the possible mergers that are
seen by the potential parties to the merger to be in clear violation of the

' I A possible candidate for a workable rule would focus on market share and immunise all vertical
restraints (price and non-price) for firms with shares small enough to make it unlikely that they enjoy any
significant market power.

I2

For a description of how the Guidelines work, see Hay and Reynolds (1985).

I 3 The Guidelines were initially issued in 1982, and implemented immediately. The 1984 Guidelines reflect
fairly modest revisions of the 1982 version.

'' The Federal Trade Commission has concurrent jurisdiction over mergers and receives the same
notification. The FTC has not issued any detailed guidelines, but its announced enforcement policy does
not suggest strong differences in the way it would analyse mergers, and in the two years since the 1982
Guidelines, few operative differences have been observed.
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Guidelines will not even reach the stage of notification, but will be
abandoned at the planning stage. Thus, for all intents and purposes, merger
policy is made not in the adversarial atmosphere of the courtroom, but
unilaterally by the Justice Department in announcing in advance what
mergers it will attempt to block. Hence, even though the relevant economic
analysis is complex, complexity has not been a bar to rapid implementation.
The Justice Department has a large staff of highly trained economists serving
alongside lawyers who by now have considerable sophistication themselves in
the use of economics. The relevant advice need not be compressed into simple
rules.
V. CONCLUSIONS

A possible conclusion from this contrast between merger policy and both
predatory pricing and vertical restraints is that, at least where the relevant
economic analysis is likely to be complex and not easily compressed into
simple rules, policy is best made outside the judicial arena, perhaps, as in the
case of US merger policy, by an executive agency acting unilaterally or, as,
for example, in the case of the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission, by
an expert body operating in an administrative or quasi-administrative fashion
(depending upon the extent of adversarial input, e.g. cross-examination of
expert witnesses, that will be permitted). Indeed, it might be concluded that
general-purpose courts should play no role at all in anti-trust, since, even
where the relevant economics could be compressed into simple rules, the
expert agency could accomplish the same result, perhaps more rapidly, and
with less opportunity for confusion.
However, the same examples used in this paper to support the argument
that courts are not the ideal forum for incorporating sophisticated economic
analysis can be used to illustrate that removal of anti-trust altogether from
the judicial mode carries with it certain risks that may warrant serious
consideration. It will be recalled that, in relating the rapid adoption by the
courts of the Areeda-Turner rule on predatory pricing, I did not indicate
agreement with the Areeda-Turner analysis or approval of the resulting rules.
As it turned out many commentators did not agree with their analysis and in
the wake of the publication of their article, a virtual tidal wave of literature
emerged, criticising the Areeda-Turner analysis, condemning the proposed
rules, and offering alternatives. In addition, as courts attempted to
implement the rule in various factual circumstances, other defects or at least
ambiguities were noted.”
Since the Supreme Court had not yet blessed the Areeda-Turner analysis,
there was ample opportunity for a kind of judicial experimentation with

For a discussion of these developments, see Brodley and Hay (1981).
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predatory pricing rules as individual courts in dozens of subsequent cases
could react both to earlier courts’ efforts to apply the rules and to literature
that emerged in the interim. As a result, while the original economic analysis
has not been abandoned - indeed it is still at the core of most judicial
opinions - there has been an evolution of the original rule into a number of
sophisticated variants that attempt to correct for the perceived deficiencies in
the original. Interestingly, despite the passing of ten years time, the Supreme
Court has not yet accepted certiorari in (i.e. agreed to review) a predatory
pricing case. Perhaps this is merely chance, but one is tempted to ask if it is a
deliberate strategy undertaken in order to benefit from the ongoing period of
experimentation. When the Court ultimately takes a case, it will have the
benefit of dozens of learned articles and perhaps as many as a hundred
district and appellate court opinions as a base to work from. There is at least
a hope that the analysis and the rules that subsequently emerge will reflect
this opportunity for learning.
In contrast, the Merger Guidelines do not permit the same degree of
experimentation. For one thing, if the analytical underpinnings of the Justice
Department procedures are reflective of a particular political or economic
philosophy that is not universally well regarded, that underlying philosophy
is likely to be impervious to academic criticism. Moreover, virtually all
relevant decisions are made in one place, and while the Justice Department
may elect unilaterally to alter its analysis in the wake of unsatisfactory efforts
to apply the Guidelines to previously unanticipated fact patterns or to react to
economic commentary,I6 there is still less opportunity for experimentation
than where there are hundreds of different decision makers, as in the Federal
Judiciary I wish to emphasise, however, that the comments about the Guidelines are
meant to reflect the potential for problems in this kind of decision mode, not
any actual dissatisfaction with the present Guidelines. Nor do I wish to
minimise the inefficiency that has resulted from US courts’ clumsy and
erratic efforts to incorporate economics into the decision process. The point
is simply that where policy rests on an analytic base that does not reflect
consensus or, like any science, is continually evolving (often quite rapidly),
the judicial mode provides an opportunity for distillation, adjustment, and,
if necessary, reversal of previously well-established positions in the light of
new evidence, and for a diversity of decision making until consensus is
achieved. This is a factor that ought to be given some weight in decisions as to
how best to structure the decision making framework of competition policy.

I b

As indicated above, the 1982 Guidelines were revised after two years experience.
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